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ABSTRACT
Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) provide a prominent choice
of implementation platform for safety-critical industrial control sys-
tems. Formal verification provides ways of establishing correctness
guarantees, which can be quite important for such safety-critical ap-
plications. But since PLC code does not include an analytic model of
the system plant, their verification is limited to discrete properties.
In this paper, we, thus, start the other way around with hybrid pro-
grams that include continuous plant models in addition to discrete
control algorithms. Even deep correctness properties of hybrid pro-
grams can be formally verified in the theorem prover KeYmaera X
that implements differential dynamic logic, dL, for hybrid programs.
After verifying the hybrid program, we now present an approach
for translating hybrid programs into PLC code. The new tool, Hy-
PLC, implements this translation of discrete control code of verified
hybrid program models to PLC controller code and, vice versa, the
translation of existing PLC code into the discrete control actions
for a hybrid program given an additional input of the continuous
dynamics of the system to be verified. This approach allows for the
generation of real controller code while preserving, by compila-
tion, the correctness of a valid and verified hybrid program. PLCs
are common cyber-physical interfaces for safety-critical industrial
control applications, and HyPLC serves as a pragmatic tool for
bridging formal verification of complex cyber-physical systems at
the algorithmic level of hybrid programs with the execution layer
of concrete PLC implementations.
CCS CONCEPTS
•Theory of computation→ Formal languages and automata
theory; • Computing methodologies → Model verification
and validation; • Computer systems organization→ Embed-
ded and cyber-physical systems;
KEYWORDS
Industrial control, programming languages, formal verification,
semantics
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1 INTRODUCTION
There has been an increased emphasis on the verification and vali-
dation of software used in embedded systems in the context of in-
dustrial control systems (ICS). ICS represent a class of cyber-physical
systems (CPS) that provide monitoring and networked process con-
trol for safety-critical industrial environments, e.g., the electric
power grid [1], railway safety [2], nuclear reactors [3], and water
treatment plants [4]. A prominent choice of implementation plat-
form for many ICS applications are programmable logic controllers
(PLCs) that act as interfaces between the cyber world–i.e., the mon-
itoring entities and process control–and the physical world–i.e., the
underlying physical system that the ICS is sensing and actuating.
Efforts to verify the correctness of PLC applications focus on the
code that is loaded onto these controllers [5], [6], [7], [8]. Existing
methods are based on model checking of safety properties specified
in modal temporal logics, e.g., Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) [9]
and Computation Tree Logic (CTL) [10]. However, since PLC code
does not include a model of the system plant, such analyses are
limited to more superficial, discrete properties of the code instead
of analyzing safety properties of the resulting physical behavior.
In this paper, we thus start from hybrid systems models of ICS,
in which the discrete computations of controllers run together with
the continuous evolution of the underlying physical system. That
way, correctness properties that consider both control decisions
and physical evolution can be verified in the theorem prover KeY-
maera X [11]. The verified hybrid programs can then be compiled
to PLC code and executed as controllers. The reverse compilation
from PLC code to hybrid programs facilitates verifying existing
PLC code with respect to pre-defined models of the continuous
plant dynamics.
In this paper, we presentHyPLC, a tool that compiles verified hy-
brid systems models into PLC code and vice versa. Figure 1 depicts a
high-level overview of the bidirectional compilation provided byHy-
PLC. The hybrid models are specified in differential dynamic logic,
dL [12, 13], which is a dynamic logic for hybrid systems expressed
as hybrid programs. Compiling hybrid programs to PLC code gen-
erates deterministic implementations of the controller abstractions
typically found in hybrid programs, which focus on capturing the
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Figure 1: HyPLC provides a bidirectional translation of the
discrete control of a verifiable hybrid program expressed
in dL and the control logic code that runs on a PLC in the
context of a cyber-physical industrial control system
safety-relevant decisions for verification purposes concisely with
nondeterministic modeling concepts. Nondeterminism in hybrid
programs can be beneficial for verification since nondeterministic
models address a family of (control) programs with a single proof
at once, but is detrimental to implementation with Structured Text
(ST) programs on PLCs. Therefore, in this paper we focus on hy-
brid programs in scan cycle form. The compilation adopts the IEC
61131-3 standards for PLCs [14]. Compiling PLC code to dL and
hybrid programs, implemented on top of the open-source MATIEC
IEC 61131-3 compiler [15], provides a means of analyzing PLC code
on pre-defined models of continuous evolution with the deductive
verification techniques of KeYmaera X. The core contributions of
this paper lie in our correctness proofs for the bidirectional compila-
tion, so that both directions of compilation yield a way of obtaining
code with safety guarantees. Finally, we evaluated our tool on a
water treatment testbed [16] that consists of a distributed network
of PLCs.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides
background information. Section 3 introduces compilation rules
for terms in both languages and describes how the semantics is
preserved. Section 4 and Section 5 describe the compilation of
formulas and programs, respectively, and include formal proofs of
correctness and preservation of safety across compilation. Section 6
presents our evaluation of HyPLC on a water treatment case study.
We discuss the limitations of HyPLC and conclude in Section 7.
2 PRELIMINARIES
This section explains the preliminaries necessary to understand the
underlying concepts of HyPLC. We first provide a brief overview
of PLCs, including how they are integrated into ICS as well as the
associated programming languages and software model as defined
by the IEC 61131-3 standard for PLCs [14]. We then discuss previ-
ous works in formal verification of PLC programs, followed by an
overview of the dynamic logic and hybrid program notation used
by HyPLC.
CPU OutputInput Hardware
Control Logic
O1
O2
I1
I2
I3
I4
HMIICS Network
Sensor Actuator
Cyber World
Physical World
Scan Cycle
If(I1<I2) THEN O1:= 0;
ELSIF(I3>I4)
END_IF;
THEN O2:= 1;
Figure 2: The PLC scan cycle in the context of ICS
2.1 Programmable Logic Controllers
Part 3 of the IEC 61131 standards [14] for PLCs specifies both the
software architecture as well as the programming languages for the
control programs that run on PLCs. We will provide the requisite
knowledge for understanding the assumptions made by HyPLC.
PLCs in the context of ICS. Figure 2 shows how PLCs are inte-
grated into ICS as well as a schematic overview of the PLC scan
cycle. Scan cycles are typical control-loop mechanisms for embed-
ded systems. The PLC “scans” the input values coming from the
physical world and processes this system state through the control
logic of the PLC, which is essentially a reprogrammable digital logic
circuit. The outputs of the control logic are then forwarded through
the output modules of the PLC to the physical world. HyPLC fo-
cuses on hybrid programs of a shape that fits to this scan cycle
control principle using time-triggered models.
Programming languages and software execution model. Hy-
PLC focuses on bidirectional compilation of the Structured Text (ST)
language, which is a textual language similar to Pascal that, for
formal verification purposes [17], can be augmented to subsume
all other languages1 defined by the IEC 61131-3 standard. For the
software execution model, we refer to [14]. We initially consider
a single-resource configuration of a PLC that has a single task as-
sociated with a particular program that executes for a particular
interval, ε . Because, it is a single task configuration, we initially do
not consider priority scheduling.
2.2 PLC Programming Language Verification
Due to their wide use, there have been numerous works regarding
the verification of safety properties of PLC programming languages.
Rausch et al. [18] modeled PLC programs consisting only of Boolean
variables, single static assignment of variables, no special functions
or function blocks, and no jumps except subroutines. Such an ap-
proach was an initial attempt to provide formal verification of
discrete properties of the system, i.e., properties that can be de-
rived and verified purely from the software, ignoring the physical
behavior of its plant. Similarly, other approaches have been pre-
sented whose safety properties are specified and modeled using
linear temporal logic [19, 20] or by representing the system as a
1ladder diagrams (LD), function block diagrams (FBD), sequential function charts
(SFC), and instruction list (IL)
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finite automaton [21–23]. The formal verification of such systems
is limited by state-space exploration techniques, e.g., there will be
an uncontrollable number of states for continuous systems because
time is a variable. As such, these techniques will only be able to
explore a subset of the states.
Conversely, there have been several works regarding the gener-
ation of PLC code based on the formal models of PLC code. PLC-
Specif [6] is a framework for generating PLC code based on finite
automata representations of the PLC. Although this framework pro-
vides a means of generating PLC code based on formally verified
models, the formal verification has the aforementioned limitations
of providing correctness guarantees for discrete properties of the
PLC code that can be verified for a finite time horizon. The approach
presented by Sacha [24] has similar limitations since it uses state
machines to represent finite-state models of PLC code. Darvas et al.
also used PLCSpecif for conformance checking of PLC code against
temporal properties [25]. Flordal et al. automatically generated PLC-
code for robotic arms based on generated zone models to ensure the
arms do not collide with each other as well as to prevent deadlock
situations [26]. The approach generates a finite-state model of the
robot CPS environment that is then used to generate supervisory
code within the PLC that controls its arm. The approach abstracts
the PLC’s discrete properties and does not incorporate the PLC’s
timing properties into the physical plant model. Furthermore, this is
a domain-specific approach for robot simulation environments and
does not provide generalizability nor a means of formal verification
of the initially generated finite-state models.
VeriPhy [27] compiles CPS models specified in dL to verified
executables that sandbox controllers with safe fallback control and
monitor for expected plant behavior. The VeriPhy pipeline com-
bines multiple tools to bridge implementation and arithmetic gaps
and provide proofs that safety is preserved when compiling to a
controller executable–while HyPLC provides bi-directional compi-
lation in the context of PLC scan cycles. Majumdar et al. also ex-
plored equivalence checking of C code and an associated SIMULINK
model [28]. Although such an approach is useful for modelling the
behavior of C code in a control system model, additional efforts are
needed to interface such a model with verification tools such as
KeYmaera X as well as to model the behavior of PLCs.
2.3 Differential Dynamic Logic and Hybrid
Programs
HyPLC works on models that have been specified in differential
dynamic logic (dL) [13, 29], a logic that models hybrid systems and
can be formally verified with a sound proof calculus. The formalized
models that use dL are referred to as hybrid programs. As with ST,
we will recall the syntax and semantics of dL and hybrid programs
as needed throughout the course of this paper.
The modal operators [α] and ⟨α⟩ are used to formally describe
the behavioral properties the system has to satisfy. If α denotes a
hybrid program, and ϕ andψ are formulas, then the dL formula
ϕ → [α]ψ
means “if ϕ is initially satisfied, thenψ holds true for all the states
after executing the hybrid program α”. This way, safety properties
PLC1 
x1 
V1 
Valve Water Level Sensor 
H 
L 
f1 
Flow Meter 
f2 
P 
Pump 
V2 
x2 
H 
L 
Figure 3: The first process control components for a water
treatment testbed [16].
can be encoded for a model α . We use the modeling pattern
A→ [{ctrl; plant}∗]S,
where A represents assumptions on the initial state of the system,
ctrl describes the discrete control transitions of the system, plant
defines the continuous physical behavior of the system, and S is
the safety property we want to prove. In this pattern, control and
plant are repeated any number of times, as indicated with the
nondeterministic repetition operator ∗.
We use FV(ϕ) to refer to the free variables and BV(ϕ) to refer
to the bound variables of formula ϕ (accordingly for terms and
programs) [13].
2.4 Use Case: Water Treatment Testbed
As a running example for this paper, we will use a simple water
tank component taken from the first of six control processes of a
water treatment testbed [16], depicted in Figure 3. This process is
responsible for taking in water from a rawwater source and feeding
it into a tank. This water will then be pumped out into a second
tank to be treated with chemicals. For this first process, the PLC is
responsible for controlling the inflow of water for both tanks by
opening or closing valves,V1 andV2, as well as the outflow of water
to the second tank by running the pump, P . The PLC monitors the
water level of both water tanks, x1 and x2, to ensure that V1 and
V2, respectively, are closed before each respective tank overflows
beyond an upper bound, H . Furthermore, the PLC is responsible for
protecting the outflow pump, P , by ensuring that the pump is off if
the water level of x1 is below a lower threshold, L, or if the flow rate
of the pump, f2, is below a certain lower threshold, FL (not pictured
in Figure 3). Figure 4 shows a simplified representation of the actual
ST code that is loaded onto the PLC for a particular sample rate of
ε for all the associated sensors. In this model, the flow rate for the
incoming raw water, f1, is not incorporated into the process control.
The real system simply monitors the value of this flow rate without
establishing a physical dependency. The upper limits of the water
tank level, H1 and H2, and the lower limits, L1 and L2, represent
trigger levels that are below and above, respectively, the actual
safety thresholds, HH and LL . The trigger values were determined
empirically in [16]; in our proofs, we will find and verify symbolic
characterizations of these trigger values. This simple model will be
used throughout the paper to illustrate how an existing ST program
can be systematically compiled to the discrete control of a hybrid
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PROGRAM prog0
VAR_INPUT x1 , x2 , f1 , f 2 : REAL ; END_VAR
VAR_OUTPUT V1 , V2 , P : BOOL ; END_VAR
IF ( x1 >= H1 ) THEN V1 : = 0 ; ELSE
IF ( x1 <= L1 ) THEN V1 : = 1 ; END_IF ;
END_IF ;
IF ( x2 <= L2 ) THEN P : = 1 ; V2 : = 1 ; END_IF ;
IF ( x1 <= LL OR f 2 <= FL OR x2 >= H2 ) THEN
P : = 0 ; V2 : = 0 ; END_IF ;
END_PROGRAM
CONFIGURATION Conf ig0
RESOURCE Res0 ON PLC
TASK Main ( INTERVAL : =T#1 s , PRIORITY : = 0 ) ;
PROGRAM I n s t 0 WITH Main : prog0 ;
END_RESOURCE
END_CONFIGURATION
Figure 4: ST program for simplified process control of the
system in Figure 3
program and updated if necessary to ensure the safe operation of
the ICS.
3 COMPILATION OF TERMS
Compilation approach overview. Compilation between ST and
hybrid programs bases on two main ingredients: the syntax of the
languages, given in grammars, define their notation; the language
semantics give meaning to the syntactic constructs. Compilation
translates from one syntax to another, but it must be done in a way
that preserves the semantics of the compiled programs.
With compilation rules, we define how to compile a term, for-
mula, or program in the source syntax into a corresponding term,
formula, or program of the target syntax. Each rule will compile
a certain program operator, and often invoke compilation on the
operands. For example, ST(ϕ ∧ψ ) ▷ ST(ϕ) AND ST(ψ ) compiles con-
junction ∧ in hybrid program formulas into conjunction AND in ST
of the recursively compiled sub-formulas ϕ andψ . Here, ST(ϕ ∧ψ )
means that we compile hybrid program formula ϕ ∧ψ into an ST
formula; the operator ▷ describes how the compilation is done.
With proofs of compilation correctness we then show that the
compilation rules preserve the semantics in a way that will allow
us to conclude safety of an ST program from a safety proof of a
hybrid program. The proofs will exploit the recursive nature of the
compilation rules and apply structural induction on the program
syntax constructs, where we inductively justify each compilation
rule from its easier pieces, basing on the hypothesis that the easier
pieces are correctly built from the base constructs (e.g. complicated
terms built from numbers and variables).
For terms and propositional formulas, the compilation rules are
mostly straightforward. The main syntactic difference is between
nondeterministic choices in hybrid programs and if-then-else con-
structs in ST. Aligning the semantics in the compilation correctness
proofs, however, requires more work: the semantics of ST is given
as an operational semantics [17], which describes the effects of tak-
ing a step in a program, whereas the semantics of hybrid programs
is denotational, which describes how states are related through
operations of a program.
Term compilation overview. In this section, we will define birec-
tional compilation rules of the arithmetic terms in both hybrid
programs and ST for PLCs. The terms of ST are the leaf elements
of ST expressions that represent the values stored in the PLC’s
memory and directly affect the sensing and actuation of the cyber-
physical system for a particular context. As such, these values will
need to be abstracted to represent the terms of an equivalent hybrid
program. We will first discuss syntax of the terms in both languages
and then define the semantics-preserving compilation.
Notation.We write ST(θ ) for the result of compiling a hybrid pro-
gram term, θ , to an ST term, and we write HP(θ ) to represent com-
piling an ST term to a hybrid program term.We write ST(θ )▷s when
s is the result of compiling θ to an ST term, and HP(s) ▷ θ when θ
is the result of compiling s to a dL term. This notation will also be
used for the bidirectional compilation of formulas and programs.
3.1 Grammar Definitions
In order to compile terms between both languages while preserving
the respective semantics, we first define the grammar for both
languages.
Grammar of ST terms. The terms of ST considered in this paper
are defined by the grammar:
θ ,η ::= a | x | − θ | θ ∼ η where ∼ ∈ {+,−, ∗, / , ∗∗}
and where a is a number literal, x ∈ V is an ST variable, andV is the
subset of all ST variables, and both number literals and variables are
restricted to LReal2 of the numeric elementary data types defined
by the IEC 61131-3 standard.
Grammar of dL terms. The translatable terms of dL and hybrid
programs [12, 13] are defined by the grammar:
θ ,η ::= x | n | θ ∼ η where ∼ ∈ {+,−, ·, / , ˆ}
and where x ∈ V is a variable and V is the set of all variables. The
grammar allows the use of number literals n as functions without
arguments that are to be interpreted as the value they represent.
Next, we provide the bidirectional compilation rules of terms
and prove term compilation correctness.
3.2 Compilation Rules
We will first define compilation rules for the terminal expressions,
referred to as atomic terms, and compose the other expressions
following the recursive nature of the grammars.
Atomic terms. Atomic terms in hybrid programs include variables
and number literals. For the sake of simplicity, we do not consider
functions within hybrid programs as we want to focus on the core
elements of discrete control, andwe assume that the data type LReal
of the IEC 61131-3 standard represents mathematical reals. In practice,
when a PLC implements LReal with floating point numbers, this
assumption can be met with an appropriate sound encoding using,
for example, interval arithmetic as verified in [27].
HyPLC compiles number literals and variables of hybrid pro-
grams, which evaluate to mathematical reals, to numbers and vari-
ables of data type LReal of the IEC 61131-3 standard as follows:
2LReal variables are 8 byte values represented as floating points from the IEC 60559
standard.
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Number literals n and variables x then do not need conversion, so
ST(n) ▷ n and HP(n) ▷ n, as well as ST(x) ▷ x and HP(x) ▷ x .
Next, we inductively define the compilation rules for arithmetic
operations.
Arithmetic operations. Arithmetic operations are similarly de-
fined in an inductive fashion in similar syntax in both languages,
which makes translation of terms θ and η straightforward as fol-
lows:
ST(−(x)) ▷ −(ST(x)) HP(−(x)) ▷ −(HP(x))
ST(θ ∼ η) ▷ ST(θ ) ∼ ST(η) HP(θ ∼ η) ▷ HP(θ ) ∼ HP(η)
ST(θ · η) ▷ ST(θ ) ∗ ST(η) HP(θ ∗ η) ▷ HP(θ ) · HP(η)
ST(θ ˆ η) ▷ ST(θ )**ST(η) HP(θ**η) ▷ HP(θ ) ˆ HP(η)
where ∼ ∈ {+,−, /}.
We now provide the Lemmas for correctness of the translation
of terms in both directions. We follow [17] and write (θ ,ν ) →a c
to express that in ST a term θ evaluates to c in context ν . We write
ν [[θ ]] = c to express that in dL a term θ evaluates to c at state ν .
Details on the dL semantics and ST semantics used in the proof can
be found in Appendix A and Appendix B, respectively.
Lemma 3.1 (Correctness of term compilation). Assuming
LReal = R: if (θ ,ν ) →a c then ν [[HP(θ )]] = c ; conversely, if ν [[θ ]] = c
then (ST(θ ),ν ) →a c .
Proof. See Appendix C. □
We next define how the compilation of terms is leveraged to
compile the formulas of both languages in both directions.
4 COMPILATION OF FORMULAS
In this section, we compile modality- and quantifier-free formulas
used in tests in hybrid programs and conditional expressions of ST
statements. As was done with the terms of each language, we first
discuss the syntax of the formulas for both languages.
4.1 Grammar Definitions
Grammar of ST formulas. ST formulas are used in conditional
expressions defined by the IEC 61131-3 standard as follows.
ϕ,ψ ::= TRUE | FALSE | θ ▷◁ST η | NOT(ϕ) | ϕ ⌢ST ψ
where ▷◁ST ∈ {<, >, >=, <=, <>,=}
and ⌢ST ∈ {AND,OR,XOR}
The values TRUE and FALSE represent the two Boolean values a
conditional expression can take upon evaluation, θ and η are ST
terms, operator ▷◁ST ranges over relational operators used in ST,
operator⌢ST ranges over logical operators between two formulas,
and NOT(ϕ) is the logical negation of a formula ϕ.
Grammar of dL formulas. The truncated grammar for modality-
and quantifier-free formulas in dL that we consider in this paper
is built using propositional connectives ¬, ∧, ∨,→, and↔ [12] as
follows:
ϕ,ψ ::= true | false | θ ▷◁HP η | ¬ϕ | ϕ ⌢HP ψ
where ▷◁HP ∈ {<, >, ≥, ≤,=} and ⌢HP ∈ {∧,∨,→,↔}
and where θ and η are dL terms. Given these base grammars, next
we present the compilation rules and the formula compilation cor-
rectness proof.
4.2 Compilation Rules
Atomic formulas. Atomic formulas in both languages comprise
the literals true and false and comparisons of terms and are compiled
in a straightforward way:
ST(true) ▷ TRUE HP(TRUE) ▷ true
ST(false) ▷ FALSE HP(FALSE) ▷ false
Comparisons are compiled as follows:
ST(θ = η) ▷ ST(θ ) = ST(η) HP(θ = η) ▷ HP(θ ) = HP(η)
ST(θ , η) ▷ ST(θ ) <> ST(η) HP(θ <> η) ▷ HP(θ ) , HP(η)
ST(θ > η) ▷ ST(θ ) > ST(η) HP(θ > η) ▷ HP(θ ) > HP(η)
ST(θ ≥ η) ▷ ST(θ ) >= ST(η) HP(θ >= η) ▷ HP(θ ) ≥ HP(η)
ST(θ < η) ▷ ST(θ ) < ST(η) HP(θ < η) ▷ HP(θ ) < HP(η)
ST(θ ≤ η) ▷ ST(θ ) <= ST(η) HP(θ <= η) ▷ HP(θ ) ≤ HP(η)
The compilation rules for the atomic formulas are the basis for
compiling compositional formulas.
Logical formulas. Logical connectives¬,∧,∨ are straightforward,
whereas→,↔ are rewritten in terms of ∧,∨ before compilation
(similar for XOR):
ST(¬(ϕ)) ▷ NOT(ST(ϕ)) HP(NOT(ϕ)) ▷ ¬(HP(ϕ))
ST(ϕ ∧ψ ) ▷ ST(ϕ) AND ST(ψ )
HP(ϕ ANDψ ) ▷ HP(ϕ) ∧ HP(ψ )
ST(ϕ ∨ψ ) ▷ ST(ϕ) OR ST(ψ )
HP(ϕ ORψ ) ▷ HP(ϕ) ∨ HP(ψ )
ST(ϕ → ψ ) ▷ ST(¬ϕ ∨ψ )
ST(ϕ ↔ ψ ) ▷ ST((¬ϕ ∧ ¬ψ ) ∨ (ϕ ∧ψ ))
HP(ϕ XORψ ) ▷ HP( (NOT(ϕ) ANDψ )
OR (NOT(ψ ) AND ϕ))
We now prove correctness of the compilation of formulas in both
directions. In ST, we write (ϕ,ν ) →a ⊤ and in dL ν |= ϕ to say that
formula ϕ is true at state ν .
Lemma 4.1 (Correctness of formula compilation). Formulas
evaluate equivalently: ν |= ϕ iff (ST(ϕ),ν ) →a ⊤ and, conversely,
(ϕ,ν ) →a ⊤ iff ν |= HP(ϕ).
Proof. See Appendix C. □
5 COMPILATION OF PROGRAMS
Now that we know how to correctly compile terms and formulas
in both languages, we turn to compiling program constructs. Since
these programs, when executed on a PLC, interact with the physical
world, our overall goal is to provably establish safety properties of
the physical behavior of an ICS. To this end, we again show compi-
lation correctness with respect to the semantics of the languages,
which will serve as a stepping stone to describe the program effect
in the larger context of the PLC scan cycle.
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We first provide an overview of our hybrid system model of a
PLC scan cycle, before we introduce the grammars and compilation
rules for both languages and prove compilation correctness.
5.1 Scan Cycle Hybrid System Model
Control Logic
x’=f(x,u)i
Hybrid Program Scan Cycle:
(Normal Form)
A ⟶ [(i := ✱; u∈ctrl(x,i); t := 0; {x’=f(x,u); t’ = 1 & t ≤ -})*] S
Output ScanInput ScanPLC Scan Cycle:
non-deterministic input plant
execution time = -
Figure 5: Hybrid system model of a PLC scan cycle
We model the PLC scan cycle as a hybrid program of a particular
shape—referred to as a hybrid program in scan cycle normal form—
in order for safety properties verified about a hybrid program to
directly transfer to its implementation in ST.
Figure 5 provides an overview of the components of a hybrid
program in scan cycle normal form and how they relate to a PLC
scan cycle. A PLC scan cycle is a periodic process that, on each
iteration, scans the inputs, then executes the control logic to set
outputs, and finally forwards outputs to the actuators. The total
scan cycle duration in this abstracted model is ε .
Our hybrid program model of such a scan cycle uses nonde-
terministic assignments i := ∗ to model arbitrary external input
to the PLC system, such as sensor values whose state cannot be
estimated or user input from a user interface. Based on the cur-
rent state x and inputs i , the controller u :∈ ctrl(x , i) then chooses
control actions u from a set of possible choices. The plant modeled
by t := 0; {x ′ = f (x ,u), t ′ = 1 & t≤ε} continuously evolves the
system state x according to the control actions along the differential
equations x ′ = f (x ,u) and keeps track of the scan cycle duration
bound ε with a clock t .
Definition 5.1 (Scan cycle normal form). We call a hybrid program
with shape i := ∗;u :∈ ctrl(x , i); t := 0; {x ′ = f (x ,u), t ′ = 1 & t≤ε}
a program in scan cycle normal form. It is safe, if formula A →
[(i := ∗;u :∈ ctrl(x , i); t := 0; {x ′ = f (x ,u), t ′ = 1 & t≤ε})∗]S is valid.
In the following subsections, we detail how a controlleru :∈ ctrl(x , i)
is translated into an ST program and its associated configuration.
We will leave the generation of code for nondeterministic inputs
and physical plant components (e.g., monitors that check model
and true system execution for compliance) as future work.
We will use the operational semantics of ST and dynamic seman-
tics of hybrid programs to ensure that the compilation preserves
meaning. Additionally, we will use the static semantics of hybrid
programs in terms of their bound and free variables to derive con-
figuration information for the PLC code (e.g., distinguish between
input and output variables).
5.2 Grammar Definitions
We present the respective grammars for programs in each language.
Grammar of ST programs. ST programs refer to the sequence of
statements defined by the IEC 61131-3 standard that form entire
ST programs. We consider ST statements s1 and s2 as follows:
s1, s2 ::= x := θ | if (ϕ) then s1 else s2 |
if (ϕ) then s1 | s1; s2
Where x := θ is assignment of an ST term θ to variable x ,
if (ϕ) then s1 else s2 is a conditional statement where s1 is exe-
cuted if ϕ is true and s2 is executed otherwise, and s1; s2 is the
sequential composition of ST programs where s2 executes after
s1 has finished its execution. While the structured grammar can
support several other control structures such as finitely bounded
loops and case-statements, these structures can be represented as a
series of if-then-else statements. The dL grammar is composed in a
similar fashion.
Grammar of dL programs. The grammar for PLC-translatable
dL hybrid programs is defined as follows.
α , β ::= x := θ | (?ϕ;α) ∪ β | (?ϕ;α) ∪ (?¬ϕ; β) |
(?ϕ;α) ∪ ?¬ϕ | α ; β
Where x := θ are assignments of the value of a term θ to the vari-
able x , (?ϕ;α) ∪ β is a guarded execution of α (possible if ϕ is true)
and default β (can be executed nondeterministically regardless of ϕ
being true or false), (?ϕ;α) ∪ (?¬ϕ; β) is an if-then-else conditional
statement, (?ϕ;α)∪?¬ϕ is an if-then conditional statement without
else, and α ; β is a sequential composition [12, 13]. Given these base
grammars for the programs, we now present the compilation rules
and the associated correctness proofs that will allow us to conclude
safety of ST programs from safety proofs of hybrid programs. Pre-
serving safety will allow us to compile existing ST programs into
hybrid programs and analyze their interaction with the physical
plant for safety, and conversely compile the controllers of hybrid
programs into ST programs for execution on a PLC.
5.3 Compilation Rules
Deterministic assignment. Assignments of terms to variables in
hybrid programs represent the core of discrete state transitions in
a hybrid system.
The syntax and operational effect of a discrete assignment is the
same in both languages, so compilation is straightforward:
ST(x := θ ) ▷ ST(x) := ST(θ )
HP(x := θ ) ▷ HP(x) := HP(θ )
The static semantics of discrete assignments in hybrid programs
provides information about input and output variables of the gen-
erated ST code: an assignment contributes BV(x := θ ) = {x} to the
set of output variables, and FV(x := θ ) = FV(θ ) to the set of input
variables [13].
Sequential composition programs. The sequential composition
of two hybrid programs α and β lets the hybrid program β starts
executing after α has finished, meaning that β never starts if the
program α does not terminate. Sequential composition of ST state-
ments has identical meaning, and so compilation between ST and
hybrid programs is straightforward as follows:
ST(α ; β) ▷ ST(α); ST(β) HP(α ; β) ▷ HP(α);HP(β)
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A sequential composition contributes the input and output vari-
ables of both its sub-programs: it has output variables BV(α ; β) =
BV(α) ∪ BV(β) and input variables FV(α ; β) = FV(α) ∪ (FV(β) \
MBV(α)). Note that the input variables are not simply the union of
both sub-programs, since some of the free variables of β might be
bound on all paths in α—in MBV(α)—and therefore no longer be
free in the sequential composition [13].
Remark 1 (ST Task Execution Timing). The execution of a series
of statements with respect to sequential composition assumes that
the statements execute atomically, which is defined in the transition
semantics of hybrid programs. We do not model the preemption of
higher priority tasks as the modeling of the PLC’s task scheduling is
beyond of the scope of this paper and left for future research.
HyPLC assumes that the developer designs a system with multiple
tasks such that (1) the execution time of a highest priority task is less
than its period and that (2) the total execution of all tasks is less than
the period of the lowest priority tasks [30].
Conditional programs. In the translatable fragment of hybrid
programs we allow tests to occur only as the first statement of the
branches in nondeterministic choices, and we allow only nondeter-
ministic choices that are guarded with tests. A nondeterministic
choice between hybrid programs ?ϕ;α and β executes either hy-
brid program and is resolved on a PLC by favoring execution of
?ϕ;α over β in an if-then-else statement. The test statement ?ϕ in
the beginning avoids backtracking. The compilation is defined as
follows.
ST((?ϕ;α) ∪ β) ▷ if (ST(ϕ)) then ST(α) else ST(β)
ST((?ϕ;α) ∪ (?¬ϕ; β)) ▷ if (ST(ϕ)) then ST(α) else ST(β)
ST((?ϕ;α) ∪ ?¬ϕ) ▷ if (ST(ϕ)) then ST(α)
The static semantics combines the input and output variables
of both programs: output variables BV((?ϕ;α) ∪ β) = BV((?ϕ;α) ∪
(?¬ϕ; β)) = BV(α) ∪ BV(β) and input variables FV((?ϕ;α) ∪ β) =
FV((?ϕ;α) ∪ (?¬ϕ; β)) = FV(ϕ) ∪ FV(α) ∪ FV(β).
Because we only consider loop-free semantics, we avoid having
to enforce backtracking for deep tests that may exist in α or β .
Instead, the tests will simply be compiled as nested conditional
programs.
ST conditional programs statements compile to guarded nonde-
terministic choices in hybrid programs as follows:
HP(if (ϕ) then α else β) ▷
(?HP(ϕ);HP(α)) ∪ (?¬HP(ϕ);HP(β))
HP(if (ϕ) then α) ▷ (?HP(ϕ);HP(α)) ∪ ?¬HP(ϕ)
Next, we prove compilation correctness that will allow us to
transfer safety proofs of hybrid programs to ST programs. We
write (s1,ν ) → (s2,ω) to say that program s1 executed in context
ν transitions to a new context ω with remaining program s2. We
write (ν ,ω) ∈ [[α]] to say that the final state ω is reachable from
the initial state ν by running the hybrid program α .
Lemma 5.2 (Correctness of ST to HP compilation). All states
reachable with the ST control program are also reachable by the target
hybrid program: If (s1,ν ) → (skip,ω) then (ν ,ω) ∈ [[HP(s1)]] for all
ν ,ω, where skip denotes the end of code for a scan cycle.
Proof. See Appendix C. □
Lemma 5.3 (Correctness of HP to ST compilation). All states
reachable with the ST control program are also reachable by the source
hybrid program: If (ST(α),ν ) → (skip,ω) then (ν ,ω) ∈ [[α]] for all
ν ,ω.
Proof. See Appendix C. □
5.4 Preserving Safety Guarantees across
Compilation
Correct compilation guarantees that safety properties verified for
hybrid programs in scan cycle normal form shape are preserved
for the runs of translated ST programs. Def. 5.4 expresses how a
loop-free ST program is executed repeatedly in the scan cycle of a
PLC, connected to inputs, and drives the plant through its results.
Definition 5.4 (Run of ST program). A sequence of states
σ0,σ1,σ2, . . . ,σn is a run of ST program s1 with input (variable
vector) i and plant t := 0; {x ′ = f (x ,u), t ′ = 1 & t≤ε} with
scan cycle duration ε iff for all i<n the program executes to com-
pletion (s1, µi ) → (skip,νi ) for some program start state µi ob-
tained from the previous state σi in the run by reading input s.t.
(σi , µi ) ∈ [[i := ∗]] and some program result state νi driving the
plant to the next state σi+1 in a continuous transition of duration
t≤ε s.t. (νi ,σi+1) ∈ [[t := 0; {x ′ = f (x ,u), t ′ = 1 & t≤ε}]].
Def. 5.4 expresses how a ST program interacts with the physical
world; Def.5.1 says that a hybrid program in scan cycle normal
form, i := ∗;u :∈ ctrl(x , i); t := 0; {x ′ = f (x ,u), t ′ = 1 & t≤ε}, is
safe if it reaches only safe states in which S is true when started in
states where A is true. We now translate safety to the compiled ST
program. Intuitively, a hybrid program is compiled safe to ST when
any ST program run that starts in a state matching the assumptions
A reaches only states where running the plant is safe S , as expressed
in Theorem 5.5.
Theorem 5.5 (Compilation Safety). If the dL formula
A→ [(i := ∗;u :∈ ctrl(x , i); t := 0; {x ′ = f (x ,u), t ′ = 1 & t≤ε})∗]S
is valid, and a run σ0,σ1,σ2, . . . ,σn of ST(u :∈ ctrl(x , i)) with input
i and plant t := 0; {x ′ = f (x ,u), t ′ = 1 & t≤ε} starts with satisfied
assumptions σ0 |= A, then σi |= S for all i .
Proof. By Lemma 5.3: if (ST(u :∈ ctrl(x , i)), µi ) → (skip,ν ) then
(µi ,ν ) ∈ [[u :∈ ctrl(x , i)]]. Sinceσ0, . . . ,σn is a run of ST(u :∈ ctrl(x , i))
in input i and plant t := 0; {x ′ = f (x ,u), t ′ = 1 & t≤ε}, we have for
all i<n that (σi , µi ) ∈ [[i := ∗]], (µi ,νi ) ∈ [[u :∈ ctrl(x , i)]], and
(ν ,σi+1) ∈ [[t := 0; {x ′ = f (x ,u), t ′ = 1 & t≤ε}]] .
Thus, by the semantics of sequential composition [13],
(σi ,σi+1) ∈
[[i := ∗;u :∈ ctrl(x , i); t := 0; {x ′ = f (x ,u), t ′ = 1 & t≤ε}]]
for all i<n. Hence, we conclude σi |= S for all i by the validity of
A→ [(i := ∗;u :∈ ctrl(x , i); t := 0; {x ′ = f (x ,u), t ′ = 1 & t≤ε})∗]S
□
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Theorem 5.5 means that an ST program enjoys the safety proof of
a hybrid program if our compilation was used in the process (either
the hybrid program used in the proof was compiled from the ST
program, or the hybrid program was the source for compiling the
ST program). Next, we analyze the shape and static semantics of a
hybrid program in scan-cycle normal form to extract configuration
information.
5.5 Cyclic Control Configuration
ST programs are complemented with a configuration that structures
the programs into tasks, assigns priorities and execution intervals
to these tasks, and allocates computation resources for the tasks.
For a hybrid program in scan-cycle normal form per Def. 5.1
(i := ∗;u :∈ ctrl(x , i); t := 0; {x ′ = f (x ,u), t ′ = 1 & t≤ε})∗
do its shape and static semantics provide essential insight into
the required configuration information. The modeling pattern in
the scan-cycle normal form is that of a time-triggered repetition,
achieved by a clock variable t that is reset to 0 before the continuous
dynamics, evolves with constant slope 1, and allows following the
continuous dynamics for up to ε time. The combined effect is that
the input i := ∗ and control u :∈ ctrl(x , i) are executed at least once
every ε time. In the compilation setup, a value for ε must be provided
(e.g., with a formula ε = n as part of the assumptionsA in the safety
proof) and is taken as the scan cycle configuration of a PLC.
For a single task, we define the compilation of a safety property
of a hybrid program in scan-cycle normal form to a task as:
ST(A→ [(i := ∗;u :∈ ctrl(x , i); plant)∗]S) ▷
Task(ST(u :∈ ctrl(x , i)), ε),
where plant ≡ t := 0; {x ′ = f (x ,u), t ′ = 1 & t≤ε}
and Task(α ,ϵ) is a shorthand defining a task3 that executes α (here
the discrete control u :∈ ctrl(x , i) translated to ST), cyclically with
an interval ε . Similarly, we define the converse compilation of a task
with an ST program α–whose variables i are of type VAR_INPUT
from the configuration–and execution time of ε as
HP(Task(α , ε)) ▷
A→ [(i := ∗;HP(α); plant)∗]S
дiven plant ≡ t := 0; {x ′ = f (x ,u), t ′ = 1 & t≤ε}
Since the ST program does not include an analytic plant model, the
compiled controller is augmented with the differential equations
from a plant given as extra input. The sets of input and output
variables determined by analyzing the static semantics of the hybrid
program inform the program configuration variable declaration
blocks VAR_INPUT and VAR_OUTPUT, as seen in Figure 4.
Extension tomultiple tasks.A future extension to multiple tasks
would consider a single configuration of a PLC with a single re-
source that has a one-to-one mapping of task configurations to ST
programs. A designated clock tn per task would keep track of the
associated task’s execution interval εn . The task execution intervals
would be checked periodically every εsc times, which represents the
3A task is being used here to abstract the other configuration components of an ST
program, i.e., Configurations and Resources. We assume only one configuration and
one resource at a time in this paper for a single PLC.
scan cycle timing of the PLC. Any task with elapsed clock tn ≥ εn
is executed (which means that tasks are executed with at most εsc
delay).
6 EVALUATION
Now that we have provided the compilation rules that will be used
by HyPLC, we evaluate the tool on a real system. HyPLC was
implemented as two module extensions for the KeYmaera X tool:
one for each compilation direction. For the compilation of hybrid
programs to ST, the compilation rules were implemented on top
of the existing parser of the KeYmaera X tool. Given the abstract
syntax tree of a hybrid program, HyPLC generates the associated
ST code based on the compilation rules. The implementation was
written in Scala with ∼700 LoC.
Similarly, the module for the compilation of an ST program to
a hybrid program was implemented on top of the lexical analysis
provided by the MATIEC IEC 61131-3 compiler [15]. The MATIEC
compiler provides modules that compile ST programs to either C
code or other languages provided by the IEC standard. With the
same APIs we implemented the compilation rules from the abstract
syntax tree of an ST program. The module was implemented in C++
with ∼1000 LoC.
We next present how HyPLC was evaluated against the water
treatment testbed.
6.1 Use Case: Water Treatment Testbed
In the case study, we first compiled the PLC code from the water
treatment testbed shown in Figure 4 into a hybrid program. For-
mal verification in KeYmaera X showed that this implementation
is unsafe. We then updated the generated hybrid program with
the necessary assumptions to guarantee the safety of the ICS. Fi-
nally, we compiled the fixed hybrid program into PLC code that,
by Theorem 5.5, enjoys the safety proof of the hybrid program.
6.1.1 Counterexamples in Existing PLC Code. In order to com-
pile the ST controller into a hybrid program of the water treatment
testbed, we provide the continuous plant of the ICS in terms of dif-
ferential equations, as well as the initial state constraints A. These
are combined with the compiled ctrl of the ICS that provides the
discrete-state transitions of the system. Finally, we define the safety
requirement, S , that ensures that the water tank levels always re-
main within their upper (HH ) and lower (LL) thresholds.
Figure 6 shows the full hybrid program generated byHyPLC that
incorporates both the compiled ST code as well as the continuous
dynamics of the water treatment testbed. Intuitively, this model
cannot be proven as there are no constraints on the flow rates f1
and f2, nor do the guards on actuation enforce such constraints. We
use KeYmaera X and the dL proof calculus to find counterexamples
for the faulty combinations of operating the valves V1 and V2, both
for concrete threshold values [31] and the generalized threshold
conditions LL < L1 < H1 < HH ∧ LL < L2 < H2 < HH of Figure 6.
Some representative examples are listed below:
• If x1 ≥ H1 (so V1 = 0) and x2 ≤ H2 (so V2 = 1): without
time and flow rate bounds, the pump may drain the first tank
when it attempts to protect underflow in the second tank; it
may also cause overflow of the second tank.
• If only V1 = 1 is open, the first tank may overflow.
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A→ [{in; ctrl; t := 0; {plant & Q }}∗]S
A ≡ L1 ≤ x1 ∧ x1 ≤ H1 ∧ L2 ≤ x2 ∧ x2 ≤ H2
∧V1 = 0 ∧V2 = 0 ∧ P = 0
∧ ε ≥ 0 ∧ FL > 0 ∧ LL < L1 ∧ LL < L2
∧ L1 < H1 ∧ L2 < H2 ∧ H1 < HH ∧ H2 < HH
in ≡ f1 := ∗; f2 := ∗
ctrl ≡ { ? (x1 ≥ H1); V1 := 0
∪ ?¬(x1 ≥ H1); { ? (x1 ≤ L1);V1 := 1
∪ ?¬(x1 ≤ L1)}
};
{ ? (x2 ≤ L2); P := 1; V2 := 1
∪ ?¬(x1 ≤ L2)};
{ ?(x1 < LL ∨ f2 ≤ FL ∨ x2 > H2); P := 0; V2 := 0
∪ ?¬(x1 < LL ∨ f2 ≤ FL ∨ x2 > H2)}
plant ≡ x ′1 = V1 · f1 −V2 · P · f2, x ′2 = V2 · P · f2, t ′ = 1
Q ≡ t ≤ ε ∧ x1 ≥ 0 ∧ x2 ≥ 0 ∧ f1 ≥ 0 ∧ f2 ≥ 0
S ≡ LL ≤ x1 ∧ x1 ≤ HH ∧ LL ≤ x2 ∧ x2 ≤ HH
Figure 6: Hybrid program generated by HyPLC. This is a
compilation of the PLC code in Figure 4
• If both valves are open, either tank may overflow, or the first
tank may underflow, depending on the ratio of flow rates.
KeYmaera X finds such counterexamples by unrolling the loop and
analyzing paths through the loop body to (i) collect assumptions
(e.g., conditions in tests x1 ≥ H1, and effects of assignments V1 = 1
from V1 := 1) and (ii) propagate program effects into proof obliga-
tions (e.g., the effect of the flow rate and valves on the water level
x ′1 = V1 · f1 −V2 · P · f2 is propagated into S). A counterexample
consists of sample values for the variables such that the collected
assumptions are satisfied but the proof obligations are not. Analyz-
ing these sample values point to potential fixes (e.g., no flow into
the first tank f1 = 0 with simultaneous large out flow f2 indicates
that the valve V2 must be turned off before the first tank drains
entirely).
6.1.2 Generating Safe PLC Code. The hybrid program was up-
dated to reflect a safe system that restricts the flow rates by mod-
ifying the guard values on the discrete control. Figure 7 shows
the updated hybrid program that was proven to be safe with KeY-
maera X. Once verified, HyPLC generates the associated PLC code,
listed in Figure 8.
Comparison on real-world data. To illustrate the safety guaran-
tees of our system, we developed a Python script to analyze the
sensor and actuation values of 4 days worth of sensor data [31].
We check the values of the sensor data relevant to the process de-
scribed by our model and instantiate the parameters in the model
with the values provided in the dataset. At each time sample, the
script checks that the collective system state complies4 with the
expected test-actuation sequences enumerated in our model: the
recorded actuator commands for the valves and pump must match
4The relevant conditions to check and expected control choices can be extracted by
proof from a hybrid program using ModelPlex [32].
the expected command from our model, which is determined by
matching the recorded sensor values with the test conditions in the
model. For instance, the script records a violation if the condition
in IF (f1 > (HH-x1)/ε) THEN V1:=0; from Figure 8 is met but
the recorded actuation differs from closing the valve. We compared
the violations with the original ST program in Figure 4 where, e.g.,
the corresponding condition reads IF (x1 >= H1)THEN V1:=0;.
Figure 9 illustrates this difference on a snippet of the real data. In
particular, this snippet represents a period of manual operation. The
original model will have raised an incorrect safety violation flag,
while the model generated by HyPLC will not raise a flag during
this period.
Our results revealed that the recorded data did not comply with
Figure 8 for 238 instances5 for the verified code in Figure 8 and
439 instances for the original code in Figure 4 out of 40K possible
instances6. Note that the verified code allows the system to operate
closer to its limits for reasons detailed below, providing a more
efficient system operation while enjoying the safety guarantees of
the proofs in KeYmaera X.
Upon inspection, most of the violations observed occur during
initialization and at the thresholds in oscillating normal system
operation [31]. For example, during initialization, the data shows
a period where valve V1 is closed and the tank is drained despite
not having reached the lower threshold L1, see [31, Fig. 4b]. During
normal operation, the system slightly overshoots or undershoots
the intended limits for discrete switching states, e.g., if the system
was supposed to closeV1 when x1 ≤ L1, the systemmay undershoot
L1. These slight overshoots or undershoots are not allowed in the
original ST code, but can be tolerated in the verified model that
takes into account flow rates for making decisions.
This study allowed us to not only generate safe PLC code, but to
also reveal missing conditions in PLC code that has been evaluated
empirically to be safe. We further showed that HyPLC may provide
a means of operating a system closer to safety limits while at the
same time provably maintaining crucial safety guarantees.
7 CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
In this paper, we formalize compilation between safety-critical code
utilized in industrial control systems (ICS) and the discrete control
of hybrid programs specified in differential dynamic logic (dL).
We present HyPLC, a tool for bi-directional compilation of code
loaded onto programmable logic controllers (PLCs) to and from
hybrid programs specified in dL to provide safety guarantees for
“deep” correctness properties of the PLC code in the context of the
cyber-physical ICS. We evaluated HyPLC on a real water treatment
testbed, demonstrating how HyPLC can be utilized to both verify
the safety of existing PLC code as well as generate correct PLC code
given a verified hybrid program. Future work will focus on lifting
assumptions for PLC arithmetic, support for multiple tasks, as well
as support for security analysis. This work serves as a foundation
for pragmatic verification of PLC code as well as to understand the
safety implications of a particular implementation given complex
cyber-physical interdependencies.
5An instance of a model compliance violation is a range of uninterrupted scan cycles
where the recorded data deviates from the expected model.
6For 403K samples, the duration of each instance was on average 10 scan cycles.
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A→ [{in;ctrl; t := 0; {plant & Q}}∗]S
ctrl ≡ { ? (f1 > (HH − x1)/ε ); V1 := 0
∪ ?¬(f1 > (HH − x1)/ε ); {?(x1 ≤ L1);V1 := 1 ∪ ?¬(x1 ≤ L1)} }
{ ?(x2 ≤ L2); P := 1; V2 := 1 ∪ ?¬(x1 ≤ L2) }
{ ? (V1 · f1 −V2 · P · f2 < (LL − x1)/ε ∨ f2 ≤ FL ∨V2 · P · f2 > (HH − x2)/ε ); P := 0; V2 := 0
∪ ?¬(V1 · f1 −V2 · P · f2 < (LL − x1)/ε ∨ f2 ≤ FL ∨V2 · P · f2 > (HH − x2)/ε ) }
Figure 7: Safe controller withmixed decision conditions for valve and pump actuation based on flow rate and empirical thresh-
olds (replaces the controller of Figure 6, only the control decisions that exposed counterexamples in KeYmaera X are changed;
changes are highlighted in boldface)
IF (f1 > (HH-x1)/ε) THEN V1:=0;
ELSE
IF (x1 <= L1) THEN V1:=1; END_IF;
END_IF;
IF (x2 <= L2) THEN P:=1; V2:=1; END_IF;
IF (V1*f1-V2*P*f2 < (LL-x1)/ε OR f2 <=FL OR
V2*P*f2 > (HH-x2)/ε) THEN
P:=0; V2:=0;
END_IF;
Figure 8: ST code fragment compiled from safe ctrl (see Fig-
ure 7). The variable ε is a placeholder for the concrete task
interval time
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A SEMANTICS OF DIFFERENTIAL DYNAMIC
LOGIC
The semantics of dL [12, 13, 33] is a Kripke semantics in which the
states of the Kripke model are the states of the hybrid system. Let R
denote the set of real numbers andV denote the set of variables. A
state is a map ν : V → R assigning a real value ν (x) to each variable
x ∈ V . We write ν ∈ [[ϕ]] if formula ϕ is true at state ν (Def. A.2).
The real value of term θ at ν is denoted ν [[θ ]].
The semantics of translatable hybrid programs α is expressed as
a transition relation between states (Def. A.1).
Definition A.1 (Transition semantics of translatable hybrid pro-
grams). The transition relation [[α]] specifies which states ω are
reachable from a state ν by operations of α . It is defined as follows:
(1) (ν ,ω) ∈ [[x := θ ]] iff ω(x) = ν [[θ ]], and for all other variables
z , x , ω(z) = ν (z)
(2) (ν ,ω) ∈ [[?Q]] iff ν = ω and ν ∈ [[Q]]
(3) [[α ∪ β]] = [[α]] ∪ [[β]]
(4) [[α ; β]] = {(ν ,ω) | exists µ s.t. (ν , µ) ∈ [[α]] and (µ,ω) ∈ [[β]]}
Definition A.2 (Interpretation of translatable dL formulas). Truth
of translatable dL formula ϕ in state ν , written ν ∈ [[ϕ]], is defined
as follows:
(1) ν ∈ [[θ1 ∼ θ2]] iff ν [[θ1]] ∼ ν [[θ2]] for ∼ ∈ {=, ≤, <, ≥, >}
(2) ν ∈ [[ϕ ∧ψ ]] iff ν ∈ [[ϕ]] and ν ∈ [[ψ ]], so on for ¬,∨,→,↔
(3) ν ∈ [[[α]ϕ]] iff ω ∈ [[ϕ]] for all ω with (ν ,ω) ∈ [[α]]
We denote validity as |= ϕ, i.e., ν ∈ [[ϕ]] for all states ν .
B SEMANTICS OF STRUCTURED TEXT
Figure 10 lists the operational ST semantics based on [17]. The
context of an ST statement is denoted by ν , which is a function
ν : V → D that assigns a value from pre-defined domains D to each
defined variable x ∈ V (we use D = LReal). We follow [17] where
a program s is executed from an initial context ν and results in a
subsequent context ω that determines the values of the physical
outputs and values of the variables for the subsequent PLC scan cy-
cle. Execution of a cycle ends when the final configuration (skip,ν )
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ν (x1) = c1
(x1,ν ) →a c1 ST Variable Value
(e1,ν ) →a c1 (e2,ν ) →a c2
(e1 OR e2,ν ) →a c1 ∨ c2 ST OR Expression
(e1,ν ) →a c1 (e2,ν ) →a c2
(e1 AND e2,ν ) →a c1 ∧ c2 ST AND Expression
(s1,ν ) → (skip,ω)
(s1; s2 , ν ) → (s2,ω) ST Sequence
(e1,ν ) →a c1
(x1 := e1 , ν ) → (skip,ν [x1 7→ c1]) ST Assignment
(e1,ν ) →a ⊤
(if (e1) then s1 else s2 , ν ) → (s1,ν ) ST IF (1)
(e1,ν ) →a ⊥
(if (e1) then s1 else s2 , ν ) → (s2,ν ) ST IF (2)
(e1,ν ) →a ⊤
(if (e1) then s1 , ν ) → (s1,ν ) ST IF (3)
(e1,ν ) →a ⊥
(if (e1) then s1 , ν ) → (skip,ν ) ST IF (4)
Figure 10: Operational ST semantics based on [17].
is reached, where skip denotes the end of the code for this scan
cycle. Variables are denoted as x1, expressions are denoted as e1
and e2, constants are denoted as c1 and c2, and ST statements are
denoted as s1 and s2. Arithmetic/logic evaluations are denoted by
→a and single-step program evaluations are denoted as→. The
context ν [x1 7→ c1] denotes a context ω that agrees with ν except
that ω(x1) = c1. Figure 10 lists AND and OR as representative ex-
amples for the other arithmetic/logical operations for two ST terms
as defined by the IEC 61131-3 standard.
C PROOFS
Proof of Lemma 3.1. Straightforward structural induction from
• Number literals (n,ν ) →a n for all ν and [[n]] = n
• STVariable Value ν (x )=c(x,ν )→ac and dL variable valuationν [[x]] =
ν (x)
• Negation in ST (θ,ν )=c1(−θ,ν )→a−c1 and dL ν [[−θ ]] = −ν [[θ ]] for
term θ
• Binary arithmetic operator ∼ in ST (θ,ν )=c1 (η,ν )=c2(θ∼η,ν )→ac1∼c2 and dL
ν [[θ ∼ η]] = ν [[θ ]] ∼ ν [[η]] for terms θ and η. □
Proof of Lemma 4.1. Straightforward structural induction from
• Comparisons ▷◁ST ∈ {<, >, >=, <=, <>,=} in ST
(θ ,ν ) = c1 (η,ν ) = c2
(θ ▷◁ST η,ν ) →a c1 ▷◁ST c2
and dL ν [[θ ▷◁HP η]] = ν [[θ ]] ▷◁HP ν [[η]] for operator ▷◁HP∈ {<
, ≤,=, ≥, >} and terms θ and η.
• Logical connectives in ST
(ϕ,ν ) →a p1 (ψ ,ν ) →a p2
(ϕ ANDψ ,ν ) →a p1 ∧ p2 ;
in dL ν [[ϕ ∧ψ ]] = true iff ν |= ϕ and ν |= ψ , accordingly for
¬,∨. □
Proof of Lemma 5.2. By structural induction on ST programs
from the base case (skip,ν ), so (ν ,ν ) ∈ [[?true]], and induction
hypothesis (s1,ν ) → (skip,ω) then (ν ,ω) ∈ [[HP(s1)]].
Case 1 (Assignment HP(x := θ ) ▷ HP(x) := HP(θ )). We have to
show (ν ,ω) ∈ [[HP(x) := HP(θ )]]. Direct consequence of ST Assign-
ment and induction hypothesis: (x := θ ,ν ) → (skip,ν [x 7→ c]) for
ν (x) →a c , i.e., ν [x 7→ c] denotes a state ω = ν except ω(x) is
replaced with θ at ν .
Case 2 (Seqential HP(s1; s2)▷HP(s1);HP(s2)). We have to show
(ν ,ω) ∈ [[HP(s1);HP(s2)]]. Let (s1; s2,ν ) → (skip,ω) so by opera-
tional semantics there is µ such that (s1,ν ) → (skip, µ) and (s2, µ) →
(skip,ω). From (s1,ν ) → (skip, µ) we get (ν , µ) ∈ [[HP(s1)]] by in-
duction hypothesis, and from (s2, µ) → (skip,ω) we get (µ,ω) ∈
[[HP(s2)]] by induction hypothesis and conclude (ν ,ω) ∈ [[HP(s1);HP(s2)]]
by dL.
Case 3 (If-Then-Else HP(if (Q) then s1 else s2) ▷
?HP(Q);HP(s1) ∪ ?¬HP(Q);HP(s2)). Let (if (Q) then s1 else s2,ν ) →
(skip,ω). We have to show
(ν ,ω) ∈ [[?HP(Q);HP(s1) ∪ ?¬HP(Q);HP(s2)]]
(i) Case ν |= Q and so ν (Q) →a ⊤ and in turn (ν ,ν ) ∈ [[?HP(Q)]]
by Lemma 4.1. By ST IF (1) [17] therefore (if (Q) then s1 else s2,ν ) →
(s1,ν ) and so (s1,ν ) → (skip,ω). Hence in turn we get (ν ,ω) ∈
[[HP(s1)]] by induction hypothesis. Now (ν ,ν ) ∈ [[?HP(Q)]] and (ν ,ω) ∈
[[HP(s1)]] and so we get (ν ,ω) ∈ [[?HP(Q);HP(s1)]] by dL.
(ii) Caseν ̸ |= Q and soν (Q) →a ⊥ and in turn (ν ,ν ) ∈ [[?¬HP(Q)]]
by Lemma 4.1. By ST IF (2) therefore (if (Q) then s1 else s2,ν ) → (s2,ν )
and so (s2,ν ) → (skip,ω). Hence in turn we get (ν ,ω) ∈ [[HP(s2)]] by
induction hypothesis. Now (ν ,ν ) ∈ [[?¬HP(Q)]] and (ν ,ω) ∈ [[HP(s2)]]
and so we get (ν ,ω) ∈ [[?¬HP(Q);HP(s2)]] by dL.
(iii) Now either (ν ,ω) ∈ [[?HP(Q);HP(s1)]] or otherwise (ν ,ω) ∈
[[?¬HP(Q);HP(s2)]] and so we conclude
(ν ,ω) ∈ [[?HP(Q);HP(s1) ∪ ?¬HP(Q);HP(s2)]]
Case 4 (If-Then HP(if (Q) then s1) ▷
?HP(Q);HP(s1) ∪ ?¬HP(Q)). Let (if (Q) then s1,ν ) → (skip,ω). We
have to show (ν ,ω) ∈ [[?HP(Q);HP(s1) ∪ ?¬HP(Q)]].
(i) Case ν |= Q and so ν (Q) →a ⊤ and in turn (ν ,ν ) ∈ [[?HP(Q)]]
by Lemma 4.1. By ST IF (3) therefore (if (Q) then s1,ν ) → (s1,ν ) and
so (s1,ν ) → (skip,ω). Hence in turn we get (ν ,ω) ∈ [[HP(s1)]] by
induction hypothesis. Now (ν ,ν ) ∈ [[?HP(Q)]] and (ν ,ω) ∈ [[HP(s1)]]
and so we get (ν ,ω) ∈ [[?HP(Q);HP(s1)]] by dL.
(ii) Caseν ̸ |= Q and soν (Q) →a ⊥ and in turn (ν ,ν ) ∈ [[?¬HP(Q)]]
by Lemma 4.1. By ST IF (4) therefore (if (Q) then s1,ν ) → (skip,ν ).
Now (ν ,ν ) ∈ [[?¬HP(Q)]] andν = ω and so we get (ν ,ω) ∈ [[?¬HP(Q)]]
by dL.
(iii) Now either (ν ,ω) ∈ [[?HP(Q);HP(s1)]] or (ν ,ω) ∈ [[?¬HP(Q)]]
and so we conclude (ν ,ω) ∈ [[?HP(Q);HP(s1) ∪ ?¬HP(Q)]]. □
Proof of Lemma 5.3. By structural induction over hybrid pro-
grams from the base case (skip,ν ) so (ν ,ν ) ∈ [[?true]], and induction
hypothesis (ST(α),ν ) → (skip,ω) then (ν ,ω) ∈ [[α]].
Case 1 (Assignment ST(x := θ ) ▷ ST(x) := ST(θ )). We have to
show (ν ,ω) ∈ [[x := θ ]]. From ST Assignment, we know that (ST(x) :=
ST(θ ),ν ) → (skip,ν [ST(x) 7→ c]) for ST(θ ) →a c , i.e., there is a
HyPLC: Hybrid PLC Translation for Verification ICCPS’19, April 2019, Montreal, Canada
state ω which agrees with ν except for the value of ST(x): ω(ST(x)) =
[[ST(θ )]]ν and we conclude (ν ,ω) ∈ [[x := θ ]] by dL from Lemma 3.1.
Case 2 (Seqential ST(α ; β) ▷ ST(α); ST(β)). We have to show
(ν ,ω) ∈ [[α ; β]]. Let (ST(α ; β),ν ) → (skip,ω) and so by operational
semantics there is µ such that (ST(α),ν ) → (skip, µ) and (ST(β), µ) →
(skip,ω). Therefore in turn (ν , µ) ∈ [[α]] and (µ,ω) ∈ [[β]] by induc-
tion hypothesis and we conclude (ν ,ω) ∈ [[α ; β]] by dL.
Case 3 (Guarded Choice ST(?Q ;α ∪ β) ▷ if (ST(Q)) then ST(α)
else ST(β)). Let (if (ST(Q)) then ST(α) else ST(β),ν ) → (skip,ω)).
We have to show (ν ,ω) ∈ [[?Q ;α ∪ β]].
(i) Caseν |= Q and soν (ST(Q)) →a ⊤ and in turn (ν ,ν ) ∈ [[?Q]] by
Lemma 4.1. By ST IF (1) therefore (if (ST(Q)) then ST(α) else ST(β),ν ) →
(ST(α),ν )) and in turn (ST(α),ν )) → (skip,ω). Now (ν ,ω) ∈ [[α]] by
induction hypothesis and we therefore get (ν ,ω) ∈ [[?Q ;α]] by dL.
(ii) Case ν ̸ |= Q and so ν (ST(Q)) →a ⊥. By ST IF (2) therefore
(if (ST(Q)) then ST(α) else ST(β),ν ) → (ST(β),ν )) and so (ST(β),ν )) →
(skip,ω) and in turn (ν ,ω) ∈ [[β]] by induction hypothesis.
(iii) Now either (ν ,ω) ∈ [[?Q ;α]] or (ν ,ω) ∈ [[β]] and we conclude
(ν ,ω) ∈ [[?Q ;α ∪ β]] by dL.
Case 4 (If-Then-Else ST(?Q ;α ∪ ?¬Q ; β) ▷ if (ST(Q)) then
ST(α) else ST(β)). We have to show (ν ,ω) ∈ [[?Q ;α ∪ ?¬Q ; β]]. Let
(if (ST(Q)) then ST(α) else ST(β),ν ) → (skip,ω)).
(i) Caseν |= Q and soν (ST(Q)) →a ⊤ and in turn (ν ,ν ) ∈ [[?Q]] by
Lemma 4.1. By ST IF (1) therefore (if (ST(Q)) then ST(α) else ST(β),ν ) →
(ST(α),ν )) and in turn (ST(α),ν )) → (skip,ω). Now (ν ,ω) ∈ [[α]] by
induction hypothesis and we therefore get (ν ,ω) ∈ [[?Q ;α]] by dL.
(ii) Case ν ̸ |= Q and so ν (ST(Q)) →a ⊥ and in turn (ν ,ν ) ∈ [[?¬Q]]
by Lemma 4.1. By ST IF (2) hence (if (ST(Q)) then ST(α) else ST(β),ν ) →
(ST(β),ν )), so (ST(β),ν )) → (skip,ω) and in turn (ν ,ω) ∈ [[β]] by
induction hypothesis; we conclude (ν ,ω) ∈ [[?¬Q ; β]].
(iii) Now either (ν ,ω) ∈ [[?Q ;α]] or (ν ,ω) ∈ [[?¬Q ; β]] and we
conclude (ν ,ω) ∈ [[?Q ;α ∪ ?¬Q ; β]] by dL.
Case 5 (If-Then ST(?Q ;α ∪ ?¬Q) ▷ if (ST(Q)) then
ST(α)). Let (if (ST(Q)) then ST(α),ν ) → (skip,ω)). We have to show
(ν ,ω) ∈ [[?Q ;α ∪ ?¬Q]].
(i) Case ν |= Q and so ν (ST(Q)) →a ⊤ and in turn (ν ,ν ) ∈ [[?Q]]
by Lemma 4.1. By ST IF (3) therefore (if (ST(Q)) then ST(α),ν ) →
(ST(α),ν )) and in turn (ST(α),ν )) → (skip,ω). Now (ν ,ω) ∈ [[α]] by
induction hypothesis and we therefore get (ν ,ω) ∈ [[?Q ;α]] by dL.
(ii) Case ν ̸ |= Q and so ν (ST(Q)) →a ⊥ and in turn (ν ,ν ) ∈ [[?¬Q]]
by Lemma 4.1. By ST IF (4) therefore (if (ST(Q)) then ST(α),ν ) →
(skip,ν )) and so ν = ω and in turn (ν ,ω) ∈ [[?¬Q]].
(iii) Now either (ν ,ω) ∈ [[?Q ;α]] or (ν ,ω) ∈ [[?¬Q]] and we con-
clude (ν ,ω) ∈ [[?Q ;α ∪ ?¬Q]] by dL. □
